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Case No. 19273 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT S&H INSURANCE COMPANY 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action by a subcontractor on two municipal projects to recover 
from the surety on two payment bonds the sum of $117,250.40 claimed to be 
owing by the prime contractor. The subcontractor also sought interest at the 
rate of 18% and reasonable attorneys 1 fees. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The court granted the surety's motion for summary judgment and entered 
Jildgmen t dismissing the action with prejudice, limiting the subcontractor's 
r ec'lvery to funds previously deposited in court by the surety, to-wit, 
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$77,992.16, and ordering that the funds be paid over to the subcontractui 
upon its ex parte motion. A motion for a release of the deposit was made .in. 
an order was entered by the court directing the treasurer rof """ .I•., 
County to pay the sums to the order of the subcontractor. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent S&H Insurance Company seeks affirrnance of the judgmen1 
the trial court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The surety (respondent S&H Insurance Company) agrees with th, 
appellant's statement of facts insofar as it describes the construction project 
the bonds, and the total value of the labor and materials supplied at tlit 
request of Jonco Construction Company. It agrees that $105 ,000 paid b1 
Jonco Construction Company was applied by the subcontractor (appellant 
Geneva Pipe Company) as payment on the Monticello projects And it agreeo 
that the subcontractor received two checks, one in the amount of $45,000 and 
one in the amount of $7 ,500 from Jonco Construction Company which it applied 
on open accounts that had nothing to do with the Monticello projects 
Some additional facts are material. At the time the payments were made 
by Jonco, no demand was made by the subcontractor for a designation of the 
account and the items of accounts to which the payment was to appll' 
(R. 74). In an affidavit supporting the motion for summary iuctgmenr 
John W. Maughan swore that when he learned that the funds had not beer· 
applied to the Monticello job, he notified the subcontractor that they sh 01110 
be so applied (R. 73), but the subcontractor states there is a dispute 35 ' 
this matter, though the record on appeal does not contain a copy of the 
- 2 -
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affidavit of the subcontractor's president referred to in paragraph 3 of the 
'.t:irement of facts 
The $52. 500 applied by the subcontractor to open accounts of Jonco 
, u"' truction Company was from funds paid by the City of Monticello to Jonco 
labor and materials furnished in connection with the two city projects 
IR 73) 
While the action was pending, the surety filed a motion for leave to 
•leposit funds into court, This was based upon an analysis of the value of 
the labor and materials furnished as computed by the subcontractor, 
$222, 250. 40, less the $105, 000 applied toward payment of the materials 
delivered to the Monticello Projects, leaving a balance of $117,250.40, less the 
$52, 500 of Monticello funds that were applied by the subcontractor on open 
accounts, leaving a balance as of January 31, 1982, of $64,750.40. The 
surety then added interest through March 31, 1983, and tendered into court 
the sum of $77, 992. 16, as permitted by a court order signed on April 21, 
1983, The computation of the amount tendered is set out in the attachment to 
the affidavit of Michael R. Vowles at R. 64. (The attachment shows 
$64, 913. 21 principal due to Geneva Pipe Company as of January 31, 1982, or 
$162 81 more than the figure as computed above, and inasmuch as the. error 
is in the subcontractor's favor, this discrepancy should create no problem in 
connection with the summary judgment. In any event there has been no 
rontention in the appellant's brief that this figure is incorrect if the surety is 
correct on the law.) 
The deposit was made, and on June 6, 1983, after entry of the summary 
Judgment, on motion of Geneva Pipe Company, the court ordered the 
treasurer of San Juan County to pay the funds to the company (R · 116' 
- 3 -
86h 
117). On June 15, 1983, Geneva Pipe Company filed a notice of appeal ~ 11 
the district court. 
ARGUMENT 
DEFENDANT HAD A DUTY TO DEMAND A DESIGNATION OF THE 
ACCOUNT TO WHICH PAYMENTS BY JON CO CONSTRUCTION 
COMPANY SHOULD BE APPLIED, AND ITS FAILURE TO DEMAND 
THE DESIGNATION IS A DEFENSE TO ITS CLAIM AGAINST THE 
SURETY ON JONCO'S PAYMENT BOND. 
The primary issue in this case is whether a subcontractor or materialmor. 
on a public construction project, upon receiving payment by the genm. 
contractor, may apply the payment as it chooses. 
The early Utah case of Salt Lake City v. O'Connor, 68 Utah 233, 249 P 
810 (1926), held that as against the surety on a payment bond, a materialmar. 
who had no knowledge of the source of funds paid to him, had a right t: 
apply the payments as directed by the contractor In Utah State Building 
Commission v. Great American Indemnity Co. , 105 Utah 11, 140 P 2d 160 
770-771 (1943), the court held that as against a prime contractor and his 
surety, a materialman who had received payments from a subcontractor 
without any direction for application and without knowledge of the source <'! 
the funds, was free to apply the payment as it chose. 
Davis County Board of Education v. Underwood, 10 Utah2d 14.\ 
349 P. 2d 722 (1960), upheld the right of a materialman to apply payments a' 
it chose, where the jury found that the surety had failed to prove that th· 
money applied had been received by the contractor for work done on the : 1 
to which the bond applied. The jury also found that there was no knowied;· 
on the part of the materialman as to the source of the money 
- 4 -
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Tlie question before the trial court on defendant's motion for summary 
1 u,Jgm~n t, and before this court now, is whether, on the basis of the 
1 ., rgomg cases, the subcontractor was free to apply two payments as it 
. '' ,:,~ ur whether it was required to apply them to the bonded projects of 
thee City of Monticello. The subcontractor relied upon the cited cases, while 
th•· surety relied upon the provisions of 58A-l-19 Utah Code Annotated 1953 
Jnd Western Ready-Mix Concrete Company v. Rodriguez, 567 P. 2d 1118 (Utah 
1977) The statutory provision, 58A-l-19, reads as follows: 
Any owner or contractor in making any payment to a 
materialman, contractor, or subcontractor with whom he has a 
running account, or with whom he has more than one contract, or 
to whom he is otherwise indebted, shall designate the contract 
under which the payment is made or the items of account to which 
it is to be applied. When a payment for materials or labor is made 
to a subcontractor, or materialman, such subcontractor or 
materialman shall demand of the person making such payment a 
designation of the account and the items of account to which the 
payment is to apply. In ~ case where !I: lien ~ claimed for 
materials furnished or labor performed ~ !I: subcontractor or 
materialman, it shall be a defense to the claim that a payment made, 
by the owner ~the -contractor-for- the materials has been so 
designated, and paid over to the subcontractor or materialman, and 
that when the payment was received ~ the subcontractor or 
materialman he did not demand !I: designation ~ the account and ~ 
the items ~ account !9_ which the payment was !9_ be applied. 
(Emphasis added.) 
In Western Ready-Mix this court held that an identical prior statute, 
58-23-14. 5, precluded recovery by a materialman against an owner who had 
failed to provide a payment bond as required by 14-2-1 Utah Code Annoted 
1953. The subcontractor in the present case takes the position that 58A-l-19 
Utah Code Annotated 1953 operates in a very narrow field, and does not 
'JJPIY to cases other than those involving mechanic's liens or failures to 
' IJtain bonds as required by 14-2-1. Public contracts, and sureties on public 
contracts, it is argued, gain no benefit from the statute. 
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The underscored portion of the statute refers only to cases in which 
lien is claimed for materials furnished or labor performed It does not rH·· 
to public contracts or to bonds required for private contracts 
But the statute does more than refer to lien claims ThP ,c 
sentence of the section requires subcontractors and materialmen, m any ca·. 
in which any owner or contractor makes payment, to demand a designation ,·,; 
the account and the items of account to which the payment is to appl\· 
Where the owner or contractor has not designated the account, th' 
subcontractor or materialman must demand a designation 
The question arises as to whether the obligation of the subcontractor or 
materialman to demand a designation of the account creates a duty, and hence 
a corresponding right, without a remedy? Can a subcontractor or materialman 
on a public contract thumb his nose at the owner or contractor, refuse 
demand a designation of the account, and suffer no consequences from his 
failure to comply with the statute? 
Western Ready-Mix would seem to indicate that owners and contractor' 
have some remedy against persons other than lien claimants, because the case 
addresses itself primarily to the failure to bond. Moreover, this court m the 
past has treated the bonding statutes and the lien statutes as analogous 
King Bros. , Inc. v. Utah QIT Kiln Co. , 13 Utah2d 339, 374 P. 2d 254 (1962J 
There seems to be no reason for applying the statute to lien claims, bu1 
not applying it to other construction contracts in which no lien claJ.ID 15 
involved, either because the time to file had run or because a public contrcct 
is involved. The Western Ready-Mix court applied the statute by analogy " 
a bonding-type situation, and it is submitted that the statute should be ' 0 
applied in this case. 
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As pointed out in 2A Sutherland Statutory Construction (4th ed.) 
§ SS 02. p 380, we find the following: 
Remedies made available by statute have been extended by 
<'nurts to permit their use to enforce other rights than those 
mentioned in the statute, where there is no perceivable reason to 
differentiate between the rights mentioned and those not mentioned 
1n regard to the suitability of the statutory remedy. And an array 
of statutory provisions authorizing the use of injunctive remedies in 
situations where they would not have been available according to 
traditwnal doctrine has been considered sufficient basis for 
extending the remedy of an injunction to other situations not unlike 
those to which the statutes specifically pertained. * * * 
The author also states, in § 55.03, p. 383: 
If a statute which creates a right does not indicate expressly 
the remedy, one is implied, and resort may be had to the common 
law, or the general method of obtaining relief which has displaced 
or supplemented the common law. And where a statute imposes a 
duty but is silent as to when it is to be performed, a reasonable 
time is implied. 
The statute under consideration creates a right in owners and 
contractors, and establishes a duty on the part of subcontractors and 
materialmen. A remedy should be implied, and the remedy that should be 
imµlied is that payments made by an owner or contractor from funds received 
for a particular construction project should be applied as payment for labor 
and materials supplied to that project. 
The subcontractor in this case argues that 58A-l-19 should not be 
applied because it is contrary to the provisions of 63-56-38 Utah Code 
Annotated 1953, part of the present statutory scheme relating to public 
con tract bonds. It argues that the following provision in 63-56-38 is 
mc:ons1stent: 
(3) Any person who has furnished labor or material to the 
contractor or subcontractor for the work provided in the 
contract * * * [and who has not been paid] shall have the right !2. 
sue <:'.~ the payment bond for ~ amount .unpaid !!! the time the 




The argument misses the point of 58A- l - l 9, which is a statute specif \'ir: 
acts that will constitute payment for labor and materials furnisher! , 
connection with construction projects. If 58A-l-19 applies, thin 
provisions of paragraph (3) do not come into effect, because th1"rt ,. 
arnoun t unpaid. 
II 
BECAUSE OF THE PROVISIONS OF 58A-l-19 U.C A 1953, THERE 
IS NO GENUINE ISSUE AS TO ANY MATERIAL FACT. 
In this case there is no dispute as to the source of the funds used c:. 
the contractor to pay $52, 500 to the subcontractor, or as to the fact that tht 
subcontractor did not demand a designation of the account to which thE 
payment was to be applied, or as to the fact that the payments were applied 
to other accounts. 
If the statute is interpreted as suggested under point I, there is n'. 
genuine issu,.e as to any material fact and the surety is entitled to judgment 
as a matter of law. 
If the statute is not given that effect, but is given the effect Ji 
permitting the owner or contractor to designate the account upon learning er 
a misapplication, there is still no genuine issue as to any material fact Tht 
affidavit of John W. Maughan is to the effect that upon learning of the 
misapplication of the payment he notified the subcontractor that the paymenr 
should be applied to the Monticello projects. The subcontractor argues thac 
the subcontractor's president states that no request was made for applic"r" r. 
of the payment, either before or after its application, but the affidavit is 11"' 
included in the record on appeal and, in any event, was not filed un Lil a flt' 




Under the provisions of 58A-l-19 Utah Code Annotated 1953, 
. 11 bcontractors and materialmen have an obligation to demand from the owner 
, ,_,_,ntractor a designation of the account to which the payment is to be 
Although the statute specifies a remedy only in connection with 
persuns claiming of liens against the property, the word lien has often been 
u'ed interchangeably with claims under bonding statutes, and in Western 
~eady-Mix Concrete Co. v. Rodriguez, 567 P 2d 1118 (Utah 1977), the court 
applied the statute to a situation in which an owner was being sued for 
failure to furnish a bond as required by 14-2-1 Utah Code Annotated 1953. 
The remedies provided by the statute should be extended to all owners 
and contractors involved in construction projects, inasmuch as there is no 
reason for drawing a distinction between public and private contracts so far 
as the remedy is concerned. 
The judgment of the trial court should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
{.Joel- R. ~ru{ge-~f~i~e.,.~d.;.'~·~.,,·~' --=-~--­
Bryce E. Roe 
ROE AND FOWLER 
340 East Fourth South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Respondent 
S&H Insurance Company 
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